Proposed Iraq - U.S. agreement

If news summaries are correct, the proposed agreement between Iraq and the United States to permit the U.S. military to remain in Iraq after the United Nations mandate expires on December 31, 2008, is notable for three reasons. First, the agreement stipulates that all U.S. military forces will exit Iraq by December 31, 2011. This means that the Bush administration will have failed to achieve one of its post-invasion goals: gaining permanent military bases in the Middle East that are not located in Saudi Arabia.

Second, the agreement presumes that Iraqi forces, police and military, will maintain domestic order after the summer of 2009 when U.S. forces stop operating in towns. In other words, the U.S. surge, lasting less than two years, was able to accomplish what the U.S. occupation could not accomplish in the three prior years. Intuitively, that conclusion seems wrong. Putting Sunnis on the U.S. payroll (the Awakening movement), sectarian segregation of Sunnis and Shiites, and temporary truces between various Shiite factions achieved far more to diminish violence in Iraq than did the relatively small increase in U.S. force levels known as the “surge.” Tellingly, publicly disclosed details of the draft agreement do not address possible U.S. responses should the level of violence in Iraq again trend upwards. I sadly but confidently predict that violence will trend upwards in 2009 as Iraqi ethnic, tribal, and religious tensions again come to the fore. Neither the Kurds nor the Sunnis want to live under Shiite dominance; the Shiites want to flex their muscles and even the score for a century of abusive Sunni rule. None of those dynamics has changed in the last two years. The triggers for the increased violence will likely be the Shiites refusing to pay the Awakening payroll (which worsening economic conditions in the U.S. makes the U.S. eager to shed) and wanting to disarm thereby disempowering Sunnis who are not part of a Shiite controlled police or military.

Third, recognizing Iraqi sovereignty in Baghdad’s green zone, over U.S. military logistics shipments, and U.S. operations in Iraq (e.g., trying U.S. military personnel for serious crimes committed on or off base and needing to obtain a court order before searching an Iraqi house) appears to be an important, positive step forward. However, that step will clash with the U.S. military’s training in warfighting and prevailing ethos. Most U.S. military personnel (military police are the primary exception) are trained to fight wars, not to conduct police operations. In war, one uses overwhelming force, rapidity of operations, stealth, and mobility to attain the objective. For example, soldiers shoot to kill; police generally shoot to disable; in warfighting, an enemy’s suspected position is destroyed (with artillery or airpower) whereas police, having identified a suspect’s probable hideout, obtain a warrant and then conduct a search. In other words, the agreement’s provisions imply a greatly diminished role for U.S. forces, create the potential for increased animosity between Iraqis and the U.S. when U.S. forces do conduct operations, and leave unanswered the question of what happens should the Shiite dominated Iraqi police and military misuse their authority and power. The prevailing ethos among U.S. military personnel and contractors is one of being shielded from Iraqi law and free to operate as deemed necessary. That ethos has certainly caused problems. Yet imposing new restrictions amid widespread suspicions about an unfamiliar foreign legal system generally thought incapable of administering justice will add to the stress many of these individuals experience while serving in Iraq.

The bottom line issue is that the United States persists in regarding Iraq as a battlefield, a view that demeans Iraqis and their cultures. Real progress toward building peace in Iraq must begin by the United States viewing Iraqis as autonomous individuals capable of determining and constructing their own future, e.g., choosing to live in three separate nations rather than coerced by external (mostly U.S.) pressure to remain a single nation. Prompt, orderly withdrawal of the U.S. and its allies is an early step in that process, a goal that most Iraqis, regardless of whether they supported the U.S. invasion, have desired since shortly after Saddam’s fall.