Partitioning Iraq

News reports the last few days have revealed the fraying of the relative calm in Iraq that created the appearance of the surge in U.S. forces having produced the desired result. First, tensions and violence are rising in areas like Mosul that lie on fault lines between Sunni and Shiite parts of Iraq. Second, the Iraqi Prime Minister, Nouri al Maliki, is acquiring the trappings of power typically associated with authoritarian Arab rulers.

Outbreaks of violence underscore the superficiality of the Bush administration’s solution that did not address the basic Iraqi problems of sectarian, ethnic, and tribal divides. The Parliament, for example, remains unable to pass a bill that would apportion oil revenues among various stakeholders in Iraq.

If Iraq cannot function as a tripartite nation – Kurds, Sunnis, and Shiites agreeing to live together in a loose confederation with little central authority – then the only alternative to chaos is for a strong dictator to emerge, a new Saddam Hussein. Nouri al Maliki appears that prime contender in that contest. He probably views his support for a continued American presence as a necessary evil to give him the time to strengthen his own grip on the nation. Competing forces and factions that would like to impose their rule on Iraq include other Shiite factions as well as Sunni groups and foreign insurgents linked with al Qaeda.

If the United States wants to achieve a lasting, more positive legacy in Iraq in these rapidly waning days of the Bush administration, the only option is to deal honestly with the real situation in that strife-torn nation. Perhaps it is not too late for the United States to help the Iraqis form a tripartite confederation. Otherwise, the war, hundreds of thousands of deaths, a diminution in the quality of life for the average Iraqi, and hundreds of billions of U.S. tax dollars will have purchased only the exchange of one dictator for another.