Iraqi elections

Two recent news reports about the upcoming Iraqi elections signal trouble. First, Anthony Shadid in the Washington Post highlights the continuing importance of tribal affiliations and influence among Iraqis (“Iraq Election Highlights Ascendancy of Tribes,” January 25, 2009). The persistent importance of tribes highlights the continuing lack of national unity in Iraq.

Second, the U.S. military commander in Iraq, Army General Ray Odierno, has identified Iraq holding peaceful elections next week as a key indicator that the post-war rebuilding of Iraq has reached a point where the U.S. can safely withdraw its forces. The general’s comments appear to presume that completing a third cycle of elections is possible because Iraq will have moved from dictatorship to the democratic rule of law (“Exclusive: Iraq commander says Iraqi election outcome key to U.S. withdrawal,” McClatchy News Service, January 21, 2009). That view seems out of touch with the lack of Iraqi national unity and widespread absence of national identity among Iraqis.

Events unfolding in Iraq have begun to remind me of the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam. The United States, for a variety of reasons, essentially declared victory and went home. For different reasons, the United States seems set on taking that same course in Iraq.

Withdrawal is the correct policy. No viable option exists, as I have previously argued in this blog. However, withdrawing and leaving the Iraqis to their fate without seeking to make the best of the bad situation that the Gulf War created is immoral. Even worse, withdrawing and then reinvading portends many more deaths, much more suffering, and even greater destruction.

The preconditions necessary for democracy to flourish do not now exist in Iraq. No amount of wishful, positive thinking will establish those preconditions. Pegging the U.S. military withdrawal to peaceful elections seems most likely to ensure the emergence of a new Iraqi dictator, perhaps the current Prime Minister, Nouri al-Maliki.

Realistically, the best option remains allowing Iraq to become three separate nations. This course of action will also minimize the likelihood of an Iraqi Shiite alliance with Iran. In the absence of a common enemy, the mutual animosity between Arab Iraqis and Persians will make such an alliance highly unlikely. Aligning internal political or other external forces against Iraqi Shiites will invariably have the undesirable consequence of pushing the Iraqi and Iranian Shiites into an alliance.

Saddam Hussein, a Sunni, avoided this problem through vicious and unrelenting oppression of Iraqi Shiites. A Shiite dictator will face challenges from Iraqi Sunnis accustomed to a century of dominance, al Qaeda Iraq that views Shiites as apostate Muslims, and Iraqi Kurds who want their independence.

A new dictator will have no viable choice but to emulate Saddam Hussein’s repressive authoritarianism in order to stay in power. Alternatively, a dictator who fails to exercise strong central authority will unintentionally unleash violent dissent from multiple, well-armed factions across Iraq. Either way, the outcome bodes ill for the average Iraqi.