Trouble brewing in Iraq

Two recent events point to trouble developing in Iraq.

First, the United States is preparing to release as many as ten thousand additional Iraqi detainees now held in Iraq, part of the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq that includes closing the large Camp Bucca prison that now holds those detainees. The release of the first sixteen thousand from the massive prison has already increased violence perpetrated by Shiite and Sunni militias. (“In Iraq, Chaos Feared as U.S. Closes Prison,” Anthony Shadid, Washington Post, March 22, 2009, p. A01)

The U.S. cannot justify morally, legally, or economically the indefinite detention of tens of thousands of Iraqis. Yet those thousands of detainees are among the reasons for diminished violence in Iraq.

Second, the United States this week marked a milestone: 84,000 of 94,000 Sunni militiamen in the Sons of Iraq (SOI) movement are now under Iraqi Army control. That looks like good news. However, anything more than a superficial glance reveals underlying problems. The Iraqi Army pays few of the SOI; only 5% of the SOI have received permanent jobs with the Iraqi security forces; many of the SOI are losing patience with the process and preparing to unleash another round of violence. (Rod Norland and Alissa J. Rubin, “Sunni Militiamen Say Iraq Didn’t Keep Promises of Jobs,” New York Times, March 24, 2009.) In sum, Iraq remains deeply fractured internally.

The only viable long-term solution in Iraq is for the Iraqis to take full responsibility for their lives and communities. Some indicators (e.g., improved approval ratings for Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki following his strong exercise of authority to force acceptance of his policies) suggest that a considerable number of yearn to return to a dictatorship that will provide some assurance of stability and security.

Iraq’s massive petroleum reserves give it a substantial economic resource. Although falling oil prices have substantially reduced the Iraqi government’s oil revenues, Iraq remains modestly affluent in comparison to the world’s poor countries. The heavily armed Iraqis must simply decide whether they prefer peace to violence, the rule of law to corruption and chaos. If they choose peace and the rule of law, they must decide whether to remain a single nation (probably under some form of dictatorship) or to divide into three separate nations.

Foreigners, no matter how well intentioned or concerned, cannot make these decisions for the Iraqis, as six years of occupation during which the U.S. and its allies sought to tutor the Iraqis have proven. That tutelage has failed. Iraqi security forces, although improving, are still inadequate. Those who argue for more training should ask, where else do the police or military receive six years of training? The answer, of course, is nowhere. The training in Iraq fails because the Iraqi trainees and their leaders have not bought into the vision of Iraq as a unified, independent nation.