Yemen

Concern about al Qaeda activities in Yemen is beginning to attract media attention, e.g., Steven Erlanger, “Yemeni Forces Kill 2 Qaeda Militants,” New York Times, January 4, 2010, and Stephen Erlanger, “Yemen’s Chaos Aids the Evolution of a Qaeda Cell,” New York Times, January 3, 2010.

The focus of this media attention is on the threat that terrorists pose to the United States and not on solving the problems in Yemen that allow the terrorists to gain traction. Yemen has a notoriously corrupt government, an oil-based economy that will skid to a stop in about seven years when the oil reserves are pumped dry, a secession movement in the south, hundreds of thousands of refugees from Somalia, and an impoverished population that lacks adequate water supplies. That litany of problems for a country with twice the geographic area of Wyoming makes like in the worst American neighborhood sound pretty wonderful. Literacy rates are 70% for men and only 30% for women. The average life expectancy is approximately 63 years.

Not until Yemenis have a realistic hope for a better future, demonstrated through measurable and sustained economic, social, and political progress will terrorists cease finding considerable traction and support among the Yemeni population. In other words, expecting the Yemeni government to act effectively against al Qaeda is foolish. The government’s central is simply to remain in power. Any other agenda takes a distant backseat to that priority.

Opposition from a corrupt, ineffective government that lacks broad popular support actually improves the likelihood of a terrorist group like al Qaeda flourishing. If the government acts to suppress al Qaeda, al Qaeda responds by depicting the government as anti-Islamic, adding to the list of popular grievances. If the government fails to act aggressively against al Qaeda, then al Qaeda grows quietly in the shadows until it has sufficient strength to challenge the government in direct confrontations. No third option exists.

Thus, U.S. counterterrorism policy in countries like Yemen must not begin by focusing directly on the threat terrorists pose to the U.S. and its citizens. Instead, effective counterterrorism in places like Yemen should emphasize improving the quality of government and of life for the average Yemeni. Building strong alliances with the people rather than corrupt regimes, supporting appropriate revolutionary movements, and opposing exploitative rulers are in fact strategies designed to cut off terrorism at its roots, roots essential for it to thrive. Too the extent that Yemenis identify the U.S. and its policies with their government, they identify the U.S. with the forces of injustice and oppression.