Responding to a reader's question about free will
An Ethical Musings' reader sent me this link
(http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/06/theres-no-such-thing-as-free-will/480750/)
to an article in The Atlantic. The article's author argues that humans do not
have free will. He then asked for my opinion on the article. In response, I provided
the reflections below.
First, reductionist anthropologies, in my estimation, fail
to explain the novelty humans repeatedly introduce. Inventions, advances in
science and other disciplines, and much more do require hard work but appear to
be more than chance outcomes generated by brain activity that, if we had
sufficient knowledge, could be completely explained in terms of chemistry,
physics, etc.
Second, brain activity apparently precedes conscious
thought, according to research and as the article argues. However, that
research does not seem to exclude the possibility that the potential to
introduce novelty into the world results from emergent properties of the brain.
In other words, the brain, like many complex systems, has capacities that are
greater than the sum of its parts. Reductionism fails to account for this
possibility, or so I would argue. Furthermore, I’ve read a significant amount
of the research on which the article is based, and agree: the idea that humans
possess free will can alter behavior. I suspect that this is another indicator
that reductionism is –pardon the pun – too simple an explanation. Of course,
many evolutionary biologists would argue that the brain evolved to accommodate
the concept of free will because that concept promotes reciprocal altruism and
other social beneficial behaviors that are most conducive to human behavior.
Third, I strongly prefer the term “limited autonomy” to
“free will.” The latter suggests that humans have a specific faculty or
capacity by which they freely make choices. That clearly flies in the face of
much scientific evidence about genetics, environmental influences on behavior,
and brain functioning. The former phrase acknowledges the many limits that
exist on human autonomy while affirming the possibility of some autonomy, e.g.,
as evidenced by human creativity. Limited autonomy lies on a spectrum somewhere
between total free and total determinism, but probably much closer to
determinism than to freedom.
Fourth, my consideration of these problems led me, over a
decade ago, to jettison the idea of punishment as traditionally understood.
Punishment is useful if it deters others from the same offense, prevents an
offender from committing additional offenses (e.g., because a child is in time
out or a criminal is incarcerated), or is an effective means of behavior
medication. From an ethical perspective, all of those are recognized legitimate
functions of punishment, but omit the central premise: the guilty should “pay”
for committing an offense. This, obviously, has implications for the Christian
faith. No atonement is necessary for sin. Instead, Jesus is a manifestation of
God's love.
My thoughts about freedom and autonomy continue to evolve.
The article’s author is correct: rethinking free will has major ramifications
for not only our concepts of moral (as well as criminal and social)
responsibility, but also a wide array of other issues.
Comments